2/21/2023 0 Comments Weapons on barsoom![]() Centralized societies have strict hierarchies, steep wealth gradients, and autocratic systems of governance. Now, very broadly speaking, we can divide societies into two types: decentralized and centralized. Thus, the society that most effectively organizes itself to adapt to the prevailing military technology will tend to displace the society that does not. The organization of the military is in turn a function of the organization of the society that produces it. Tactical adaptations don't just mean training your troops in best practices, but include the entire organization of the army. On the other hand, when two peer societies go to war, all else being equal victory will tend to go to the society that most effectively adapts their tactics to the available technologies. An entire civilization of neolithic Mexica getting rolled by a few hundred rowdy gunpowder age Spaniards is more typical. Sure, it doesn't always shake out that way - the iron age Norse getting their hairy butts handed to them by the neolithic Skraelings in Vinland come to mind - but these are very much the exception rather than the rule 1. If two competing societies have different levels of military technology, the more advanced society will almost always win. Whatever innovations you've developed in agriculture, materials science, social organization, mathematics, astronomy, or underwater basket-weaving are all quite irrelevant next to this very basic fact of life. If your society lacks the ability to stop your neighbours from smashing their way into their territory, breaking your stuff, and making off with your women, it isn't going to last long. ![]() The basic connection is straightforward enough. I'm thinking, of course, of technology, and in particular, the technologies of war. You can think of it as setting the parameters for the varieties of social order that can prosper in a given historical age. While there's certainly a place for ideas (hell, I wouldn't be writing here if I didn't think there wasn't), there are other influences that seem to have an outsize impact. ![]() The great societal advancements, as well as the great human catastrophes, are the result of ideologies, religions, and philosophies that grab hold of the minds of men, inspiring them to acts both heroic and monstrous. We like to imagine that ideas matter - that the pen is mightier than the sword. Since I want this piece to be self-contained I'll be repeating some of what he had to say, but I do encourage you to read it as he went in a rather different direction. Of all of the above pieces, it's Koehli's that's the most directly relevant. ![]() And finally, there's my own recent analysis of America's less than spectacular chances in a great power war (although the connection here is really just that I've had war on the brain).īy the end, I promise, you'll see how it all fits together. Third, there's this description of the next generation, drone-enhanced small unit tactics being developed by the Marine Corps, which I found by way of the always-interesting American Sun. Second, there's Chris Bray's meditations on the World Economic Forum's drive towards a new digital feudalism - you know the drill, you'll own nothing and you'll (damn well pretend to) be happy. First, there's Harrison Koehli's essay at the Political Ponerology blog looking at the connection between the growth of complex societies and the evolution of violence, where he describes Peter Turchin's thesis that the primary selective pressure shaping our social order was warfare rather than agriculture. This post was inspired by a few recent pieces. ![]()
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